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Abstract 
In today’s business environment, the trend towards more product variety and customization is unbroken. Due to this development, the need of 
agile and reconfigurable production systems emerged to cope with various products and product families. To design and optimize production
systems as well as to choose the optimal product matches, product analysis methods are needed. Indeed, most of the known methods aim to 
analyze a product or one product family on the physical level. Different product families, however, may differ largely in terms of the number and 
nature of components. This fact impedes an efficient comparison and choice of appropriate product family combinations for the production
system. A new methodology is proposed to analyze existing products in view of their functional and physical architecture. The aim is to cluster
these products in new assembly oriented product families for the optimization of existing assembly lines and the creation of future reconfigurable 
assembly systems. Based on Datum Flow Chain, the physical structure of the products is analyzed. Functional subassemblies are identified, and 
a functional analysis is performed. Moreover, a hybrid functional and physical architecture graph (HyFPAG) is the output which depicts the 
similarity between product families by providing design support to both, production system planners and product designers. An illustrative
example of a nail-clipper is used to explain the proposed methodology. An industrial case study on two product families of steering columns of 
thyssenkrupp Presta France is then carried out to give a first industrial evaluation of the proposed approach. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 28th CIRP Design Conference 2018. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the fast development in the domain of 
communication and an ongoing trend of digitization and
digitalization, manufacturing enterprises are facing important
challenges in today’s market environments: a continuing
tendency towards reduction of product development times and
shortened product lifecycles. In addition, there is an increasing
demand of customization, being at the same time in a global 
competition with competitors all over the world. This trend, 
which is inducing the development from macro to micro 
markets, results in diminished lot sizes due to augmenting
product varieties (high-volume to low-volume production) [1]. 
To cope with this augmenting variety as well as to be able to
identify possible optimization potentials in the existing
production system, it is important to have a precise knowledge
of the product range and characteristics manufactured and/or 
assembled in this system. In this context, the main challenge in
modelling and analysis is now not only to cope with single 
products, a limited product range or existing product families,
but also to be able to analyze and to compare products to define
new product families. It can be observed that classical existing
product families are regrouped in function of clients or features.
However, assembly oriented product families are hardly to find. 
On the product family level, products differ mainly in two
main characteristics: (i) the number of components and (ii) the
type of components (e.g. mechanical, electrical, electronical). 
Classical methodologies considering mainly single products 
or solitary, already existing product families analyze the
product structure on a physical level (components level) which 
causes difficulties regarding an efficient definition and
comparison of different product families. Addressing this 
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Human-robot collaborative manufacturing (HRC-Mfg) is an innovative production mode, however currently the theoretical explanation for the 
collaboration m cha isms is limi ed. Considering the dynamics and uncertaintie  in m nufacturing environment, it is also crucial for both task
alloc tion and decision-making. In the sight of cyber-physical product n system, base on bila eral game and clan game, this pape  presents 
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1. Introduction 
Human-robot collaborative manufacturing (HRC-Mfg) is 
an innovative production mode integrated with the concept of 
human-robot collaboration (HRC). While HRC has been
proposed in different fields and gradually applied to specific 
manufacturing tasks, mainly reflected in three aspects.
i) Advanced robot design and manufacturing company like 
ABB, KUKA and Rethink Robotics have developed Yumi, 
iiwa, Sawyer, Baxter and other collaborative robots. ii) 
Scientific research institutions and universities use new 
technologies to update traditional robots with more 
collaborative potential [1-3]. iii) ISO has developed ISO/TS 
15066, the latest collaborative robotics standard [4].
HRC has been putting forward constantly both in industry 
and academic because:
(1) The variety of products is abundant.
In the past decades of years, industrial robots are widely 
used in product manufacturing, especially in the traditional 
ones such as automobile manufacturing, food processing, 
electronic product manufacturing and chemical product 
production. With the continuous development of 
semiconductor technology, personal consumer electronics 
manufacturing enterprises such as Foxconn, Samsung, TSMC 
have become the emerging power in the manufacturing sector. 
On the other hand, due to the individual needs of product 
design of consumer market, manufacturing companies are 
pushed to continue to update the product type to seize the 
market opportunities. This requires product manufacturers to 
quickly and flexibly complete the switching and restructuring 
of their production line. 
(2) The capability of traditional industrial robots is 
limited.
Traditional large-scale industrial robots are powerful to 
handle the packaging, transporting and other similar tasks. 
However, in the face of the sophisticated electronic products 
represented by smartphones and tablet PC, they are limited to 
participate in the manufacturing of precision components. 
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Meanwhile, for the high complexity of the manufacturing 
tasks, small-scale industrial robots still cannot be as flexible 
as all the assembly process and testing.
(3) The development of remanufacturing is imperative.
Product disassembly is usually the first step in 
remanufacturing process and determines the efficiency and 
capability of remanufacturing [5]. For remanufacturing tasks 
in green manufacturing and sustainable manufacturing, it is 
very different from traditional new product manufacturing. 
The new product manufacturing process has detailed 
assembly plan and process. Its product parts and components 
are packaged in standardization. The assembly line only needs 
to install and attach the production components to the 
assembly object one by one according to the predetermined 
assembly plan and the fixed procedure.  In this process, as 
long as the manufacturing object model is the same, all the 
robot program logic, the force control, or the manual 
operations are almost constant. But even if it is of the same 
type and the same batch of products, the individual 
differences could be extremely significant in the 
remanufacturing environment of disassembly, recycling and 
reuse of the old product. 
However, as for HRC-Mfg, the theoretical explanation for 
the collaboration mechanisms is limited currently, especially 
combined with specific manufacturing tasks with complex 
environments or components. Considering the dynamics and 
uncertainties in the manufacturing environment, it is also 
crucial for both task allocation and decision-making.
Game theory includes cooperative game and non-
cooperative game. The non-cooperative game is based on 
Nash equilibrium, which was put forward by John Nash from 
1950 to 1952 [6]. It focuses on solving the game problem 
from a microscopic view. The cooperative game originated in 
the Nash bargaining problem [7], which is described as ‘a 
game of cooperation agreement’. It focuses on how to 
maximize the interests of the participants in the game and 
how to distribute the benefits for each participant. Recently, 
game theory had been implemented in HRC [8-10], but 
seldom deployed in the HRC-Mfg.
In the sight of the cyber-physical production system 
(CPPS), based on the bilateral game and clan game, this paper 
presents the characteristics of HRC-Mfg and demonstrates the 
applicability of cooperative game in such system. Moreover, 
we also developed a framework and approach to describe how 
the mechanism works in detail with a case study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the characteristics of HRC-Mfg and 
cooperative game theory in manufacturing. In section 3, the 
framework of mechanism interpretation for HRC-Mfg is 
delivered. Section 4 is the implementation and case study. 
Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Characteristics of HRC-Mfg and cooperative game 
theory in manufacturing
2.1. Human-Robot Collaborative Manufacturing System
We define human-robot collaborative manufacturing 
system (HRCMS) as a special manufacturing system based on 
CPPS. Apart from the numerical control equipment matched 
with the manufacturing cell, traditional manufacturing 
systems do not have integrated information systems oriented 
to the production line, workshop, and enterprise level. CPPS 
abstracts the physical resources in the manufacturing 
environment into virtual models through intelligent perception
[11-13]. Then the operation and evolution of the 
manufacturing system are reproduced in the virtual world. 
HRCMS can realize the information interaction between the 
human and the robot individual based on the virtual model of 
CPPS and the perception and cognition of human behaviors 
and actions. The data from CPPS can support the decision-
making system of HRCMS, and finally realize the task of man 
and robot together. In short, CPPS is the premise of HRCMS, 
HRCMS is the expansion and specialization of CPPS.
2.2. Characteristics and requirements of HRC-Mfg
For HRC-Mfg due to the dynamics and uncertainties in the 
manufacturing environment, it is crucial but difficult to study 
the task allocation and dynamic scheduling between human 
and robot in combination with specific manufacturing 
environment and tasks.
The challenge of HRC-Mfg and HRCMS mainly comes 
from the following characteristics:
 Dynamism and uncertainty. The production line, 
products, human behavior and industrial robot movements 
of HRC-Mfg are dynamic and uncertain, they will impact 
the results of the original decision. 
 Highly real-time. HRCMS must have high real-time due 
to the stringent requirements of the production rhythm in 
manufacturing workshop and production line.
 Parallelism and inequality. HRC-Mfg efficiency reflects 
the corresponding manufacturing tasks can be executed in 
parallel by the human and the robot. In the process of
HRC-Mfg, industrial robots are unequal to human workers
both in decision and action.
 Limitation of ability. HRCMS must take the ability 
limitation of the human and the robot into consideration. 
 Repetition of decision with multiple constraints. The 
decision-making results for the manufacturing process of 
each individual according to the real status of the repeated 
decision do not have the same. It also has multiple types of 
constraints, such as interactive security constraints, 
working time constraints, time cost constraints, and quality 
assurance constraints.
 Tolerance of fault. HRCMS should be tolerant to the 
delay and the fault generated by human behavior and 
action.
 Backward mechanism. HRC-Mfg embodies different 
procedures with different decisions. It is obvious that the 
current decision will have an impact on future decisions 
without affecting prior ones.
In combination with the features mentioned above, an
HRCMS needs the following capabilities:
i) Capability for manufacturing task decomposition and 
procedure allocation.
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ii) Capability to perceive and analyze manufacturing 
objects' status.
iii) Capability for perception, cognition, analysis, and 
decision-making of human activities.
iv) Friendly human-robot collaborative interfaces.
v) Capability to make a real-time intelligent decision for 
whole manufacturing task.
Obviously, HRCMS is a highly complex dynamic decision 
system involving multiple agents. In order to solve the above 
challenges, it is crucial to interpreting the mechanism for 
HRC-Mfg in a clear, detailed, and scientific way. 
2.3. Cooperative Game Theory in Manufacturing
The mechanism of HRC-Mfg can be interpreted by 
cooperative game theory, which is mainly embodied in the 
following aspects:
(1) HRC-Mfg satisfies the premise of the game.
One game requires at least two participants. Otherwise, it 
does not constitute a game. HRC-Mfg involves at least one 
industrial robot and a worker to work with it, which is 
consistent with the premise of the game. 
(2) HRC-Mfg satisfies the premise of the cooperative 
game.
The premise of the formation of a cooperative game is that 
the benefit of participants through the cooperative game is 
higher than that obtained by independent work. Otherwise, 
participants will abandon cooperation. Accordingly, 
manufacturing enterprises can only adopt HRC-Mfg when 
they can use HRC to improve production efficiency and 
reduce costs. In other words, as long as the HRC-Mfg is 
adopted, we must ensure that it can bring more benefits for 
enterprises. So we can use the cooperative game to describe
the mechanism of HRC-Mfg.
(3) HRC-Mfg has the characteristics of strong and weak 
complementation and distribution according to work.
The cooperative game allows the participants to be unequal 
in their ability and distribute the benefits according to the 
contributions of different participants. In HRC-Mfg, in the 
face of different manufacturing objects and procedures, 
industrial robots and human workers have their own 
advantages and disadvantages, and also show their importance 
to different procedures.
3. Framework and operation mechanism of HRC-Mfg
3.1. Task Decomposition and procedure allocation
In the process of HRC-Mfg, we consider that industrial 
robots and human workers should be responsible for different 
procedures. The robot and human procedure set are required 
to be described in advance according to the robot and human 
ability characteristics and specific manufacturing tasks.
Fig. 1 shows a process structure example of a disassembly 
task. A disassembly task takes the pick-up procedure as the 
start of one task and regards the stock procedure as the last 
step of it. 
In this paper, the total procedure set is denoted by S , the 
robot and human procedure set are denote by R and H . 
Obviously, for the specific procedures, some need to be done 
by people, while others need to be handled by robots. That is, 
there should be no procedure beyond the capability of robot or 
human, or a manufacturing task with different procedures 
should be able to be completed under the collaboration of the 
robot and the human.
Above all, one equation should be satisfied: R H S .
From the point of view of manufacturing capability, R is 
defined as the robotic procedure vector, while H is the 
manual procedures vector and U R H is the check 
vector. From the other point of view of manufacturing task, 
PR is denoted as the selected robotic procedures vector, 
PH is denoted as the selected manual procedures vector and 
P P PU R H is used as the selected check vector. It is 
clear for a fully allocated manufacturing task to satisfy
 1 1 1 1 1 1P nU  and ( )Pn N U equals 
to the total number of operations for the manufacturing task. 
In order to ensure the completeness of the manufacturing task, 
the check vector U must be approved on the basis of the 
complex graph or semantic model. With the progress of 
manufacturing tasks, the procedures in R and H are 
iteratively selected into PR and PH . The selected check 
vector PU of every iteration needs to be checked to 
guarantee the completeness of the procedures.
Fig. 1. Task decomposition and procedure allocation for disassembly.
In procedure allocation, any ( , )P PR H is a Nash 
equilibrium ( 0 ,0P P P PR U H U    ). As for a 
manufacturing task denoted by ( )PN U n , it has 2
n
common species with exponential growth. HRCMS needs to 
find an optimal configuration according to the working status 
of human and robot so that both they can get the highest 
efficiency and the lowest cost in the following procedures.
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Meanwhile, for the high complexity of the manufacturing 
tasks, small-scale industrial robots still cannot be as flexible 
as all the assembly process and testing.
(3) The development of remanufacturing is imperative.
Product disassembly is usually the first step in 
remanufacturing process and determines the efficiency and 
capability of remanufacturing [5]. For remanufacturing tasks 
in green manufacturing and sustainable manufacturing, it is 
very different from traditional new product manufacturing. 
The new product manufacturing process has detailed 
assembly plan and process. Its product parts and components 
are packaged in standardization. The assembly line only needs 
to install and attach the production components to the 
assembly object one by one according to the predetermined 
assembly plan and the fixed procedure.  In this process, as 
long as the manufacturing object model is the same, all the 
robot program logic, the force control, or the manual 
operations are almost constant. But even if it is of the same 
type and the same batch of products, the individual 
differences could be extremely significant in the 
remanufacturing environment of disassembly, recycling and 
reuse of the old product. 
However, as for HRC-Mfg, the theoretical explanation for 
the collaboration mechanisms is limited currently, especially 
combined with specific manufacturing tasks with complex 
environments or components. Considering the dynamics and 
uncertainties in the manufacturing environment, it is also 
crucial for both task allocation and decision-making.
Game theory includes cooperative game and non-
cooperative game. The non-cooperative game is based on 
Nash equilibrium, which was put forward by John Nash from 
1950 to 1952 [6]. It focuses on solving the game problem 
from a microscopic view. The cooperative game originated in 
the Nash bargaining problem [7], which is described as ‘a 
game of cooperation agreement’. It focuses on how to 
maximize the interests of the participants in the game and 
how to distribute the benefits for each participant. Recently, 
game theory had been implemented in HRC [8-10], but 
seldom deployed in the HRC-Mfg.
In the sight of the cyber-physical production system 
(CPPS), based on the bilateral game and clan game, this paper 
presents the characteristics of HRC-Mfg and demonstrates the 
applicability of cooperative game in such system. Moreover, 
we also developed a framework and approach to describe how 
the mechanism works in detail with a case study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the characteristics of HRC-Mfg and 
cooperative game theory in manufacturing. In section 3, the 
framework of mechanism interpretation for HRC-Mfg is 
delivered. Section 4 is the implementation and case study. 
Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Characteristics of HRC-Mfg and cooperative game 
theory in manufacturing
2.1. Human-Robot Collaborative Manufacturing System
We define human-robot collaborative manufacturing 
system (HRCMS) as a special manufacturing system based on 
CPPS. Apart from the numerical control equipment matched 
with the manufacturing cell, traditional manufacturing 
systems do not have integrated information systems oriented 
to the production line, workshop, and enterprise level. CPPS 
abstracts the physical resources in the manufacturing 
environment into virtual models through intelligent perception
[11-13]. Then the operation and evolution of the 
manufacturing system are reproduced in the virtual world. 
HRCMS can realize the information interaction between the 
human and the robot individual based on the virtual model of 
CPPS and the perception and cognition of human behaviors 
and actions. The data from CPPS can support the decision-
making system of HRCMS, and finally realize the task of man 
and robot together. In short, CPPS is the premise of HRCMS, 
HRCMS is the expansion and specialization of CPPS.
2.2. Characteristics and requirements of HRC-Mfg
For HRC-Mfg due to the dynamics and uncertainties in the 
manufacturing environment, it is crucial but difficult to study 
the task allocation and dynamic scheduling between human 
and robot in combination with specific manufacturing 
environment and tasks.
The challenge of HRC-Mfg and HRCMS mainly comes 
from the following characteristics:
 Dynamism and uncertainty. The production line, 
products, human behavior and industrial robot movements 
of HRC-Mfg are dynamic and uncertain, they will impact 
the results of the original decision. 
 Highly real-time. HRCMS must have high real-time due 
to the stringent requirements of the production rhythm in 
manufacturing workshop and production line.
 Parallelism and inequality. HRC-Mfg efficiency reflects 
the corresponding manufacturing tasks can be executed in 
parallel by the human and the robot. In the process of
HRC-Mfg, industrial robots are unequal to human workers
both in decision and action.
 Limitation of ability. HRCMS must take the ability 
limitation of the human and the robot into consideration. 
 Repetition of decision with multiple constraints. The 
decision-making results for the manufacturing process of 
each individual according to the real status of the repeated 
decision do not have the same. It also has multiple types of 
constraints, such as interactive security constraints, 
working time constraints, time cost constraints, and quality 
assurance constraints.
 Tolerance of fault. HRCMS should be tolerant to the 
delay and the fault generated by human behavior and 
action.
 Backward mechanism. HRC-Mfg embodies different 
procedures with different decisions. It is obvious that the 
current decision will have an impact on future decisions 
without affecting prior ones.
In combination with the features mentioned above, an
HRCMS needs the following capabilities:
i) Capability for manufacturing task decomposition and 
procedure allocation.
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ii) Capability to perceive and analyze manufacturing 
objects' status.
iii) Capability for perception, cognition, analysis, and 
decision-making of human activities.
iv) Friendly human-robot collaborative interfaces.
v) Capability to make a real-time intelligent decision for 
whole manufacturing task.
Obviously, HRCMS is a highly complex dynamic decision 
system involving multiple agents. In order to solve the above 
challenges, it is crucial to interpreting the mechanism for 
HRC-Mfg in a clear, detailed, and scientific way. 
2.3. Cooperative Game Theory in Manufacturing
The mechanism of HRC-Mfg can be interpreted by 
cooperative game theory, which is mainly embodied in the 
following aspects:
(1) HRC-Mfg satisfies the premise of the game.
One game requires at least two participants. Otherwise, it 
does not constitute a game. HRC-Mfg involves at least one 
industrial robot and a worker to work with it, which is 
consistent with the premise of the game. 
(2) HRC-Mfg satisfies the premise of the cooperative 
game.
The premise of the formation of a cooperative game is that 
the benefit of participants through the cooperative game is 
higher than that obtained by independent work. Otherwise, 
participants will abandon cooperation. Accordingly, 
manufacturing enterprises can only adopt HRC-Mfg when 
they can use HRC to improve production efficiency and 
reduce costs. In other words, as long as the HRC-Mfg is 
adopted, we must ensure that it can bring more benefits for 
enterprises. So we can use the cooperative game to describe
the mechanism of HRC-Mfg.
(3) HRC-Mfg has the characteristics of strong and weak 
complementation and distribution according to work.
The cooperative game allows the participants to be unequal 
in their ability and distribute the benefits according to the 
contributions of different participants. In HRC-Mfg, in the 
face of different manufacturing objects and procedures, 
industrial robots and human workers have their own 
advantages and disadvantages, and also show their importance 
to different procedures.
3. Framework and operation mechanism of HRC-Mfg
3.1. Task Decomposition and procedure allocation
In the process of HRC-Mfg, we consider that industrial 
robots and human workers should be responsible for different 
procedures. The robot and human procedure set are required 
to be described in advance according to the robot and human 
ability characteristics and specific manufacturing tasks.
Fig. 1 shows a process structure example of a disassembly 
task. A disassembly task takes the pick-up procedure as the 
start of one task and regards the stock procedure as the last 
step of it. 
In this paper, the total procedure set is denoted by S , the 
robot and human procedure set are denote by R and H . 
Obviously, for the specific procedures, some need to be done 
by people, while others need to be handled by robots. That is, 
there should be no procedure beyond the capability of robot or 
human, or a manufacturing task with different procedures 
should be able to be completed under the collaboration of the 
robot and the human.
Above all, one equation should be satisfied: R H S .
From the point of view of manufacturing capability, R is 
defined as the robotic procedure vector, while H is the 
manual procedures vector and U R H is the check 
vector. From the other point of view of manufacturing task, 
PR is denoted as the selected robotic procedures vector, 
PH is denoted as the selected manual procedures vector and 
P P PU R H is used as the selected check vector. It is 
clear for a fully allocated manufacturing task to satisfy
 1 1 1 1 1 1P nU  and ( )Pn N U equals 
to the total number of operations for the manufacturing task. 
In order to ensure the completeness of the manufacturing task, 
the check vector U must be approved on the basis of the 
complex graph or semantic model. With the progress of 
manufacturing tasks, the procedures in R and H are 
iteratively selected into PR and PH . The selected check 
vector PU of every iteration needs to be checked to 
guarantee the completeness of the procedures.
Fig. 1. Task decomposition and procedure allocation for disassembly.
In procedure allocation, any ( , )P PR H is a Nash 
equilibrium ( 0 ,0P P P PR U H U    ). As for a 
manufacturing task denoted by ( )PN U n , it has 2
n
common species with exponential growth. HRCMS needs to 
find an optimal configuration according to the working status 
of human and robot so that both they can get the highest 
efficiency and the lowest cost in the following procedures.
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3.2. Cooperative game for human-robot collaborative  model 
with multiple procedures
In HRC-Mfg, the deployment contains various forms 
including ‘one-human-one-robot’, ‘one-human-multi-robots’, 
‘multi-humans-one-robot’ and ‘multi-humans-multi-robots’,. 
This paper takes ‘one-human-one-robot’ as an example to 
describe the combination of cooperative game.
In the principles introduced earlier, it is obviously difficult 
to find an optimal solution on a large scale such as an 
exponential model, which is called the multiple equilibrium 
problems in the traditional non-cooperative game. One of the 
most important ways to solve this problem is Schelling's 
theory of focalization. By setting up the focus arbiter, it 
guides the game players to focus their attention on a particular 
equilibrium, which is the optimal direct solution in HRC-Mfg. 
There is a kind of special focus arbiter in the theory of 
focalization, which is itself the player of the game. In HRC-
Mfg, the HRCMS that the industrial robot connects is 
responsible for the game solution, and then the robot can be 
regarded as a special focus arbiter.
As the Fig. 2 shows, the procedure decomposition problem 
in one-human-one-robot collaborative manufacturing is a 
typical substantive bilateral cooperative game. And the 
procedures allocation is a typical clan cooperative game. To 
explore the mechanism of that, it is necessary to establish two 
models of the bilateral game and the clan game.
In this paper, the bilateral game refers to the cooperative 
game with only two participants. The total utility of 
cooperative game is considered as ({ , })v r h , and the utility 
of robot is given as 1x . According to the premise of the 
cooperative game, it should not be less than the benefit 
({ })v r when robot completes a manufacturing task 
independently. It’s same to the utility of human workers and 
we define it as 2x . 
Fig. 2. Cooperative game for HRC-Mfg with multiple procedures.
Clearly, it can be written as 1 2 ({ , })x x v r h  and this 
equation can also be rewritten as 1 2 ( , )P Px x v R H  to 
correspond to the procedures vector in the previous section. 
These 1 2( , )x x constitute a utility allocation. All 1 2( , )x x
form the feasible collocation set F of the cooperative game. 
According to the characteristics of human-robot collaboration, 
one 1 2( , )x x has two obvious poles, namely ( ({ , }),0)v r h
and (0, ({ , }))v r h .
For the procedures allocation derivation of HRC-Mfg, first 
of all, the procedure cost is required to be associated with the 
utility. We denote the common cost of human and robot in 
HRC-Mfg as ({ , })c h r and the cost of human and robot are 
separately hx and rx respectively, then all the configurable 
sets are formed as F , with extremes ( ,0)hx and (0, )rx . 
For a one-human-one-robot cooperative game procedure
allocation problem ( , )F e , it can be modeled as (1) with the 
inability to reach an agreement 1 1( , ) ( , )h r h re e x x
  .
1 1 1 1{( , ) | & }- - - -h r h h r rF x x x e x e  (1)
It is a cooperative game of substantial essential. According to 
Nash axiom, the Nash solution of the game is (2).
1 1
1 1
,
( , ) argmax( )( )h h r r
x F x e
F e x e x e
 
 
 
    (2)
The cost function of the allocation scheme can be set 
according to the specific manufacturing tasks, such as by 
different indicators (like time cost ( )ti x , energy cost ( )ec x
and so on) in the weighted sum form (3).
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nc x ti x ec x other x         (3)
In addition to Nash solution, there are also egalitarian 
solutions, utilitarian solutions, Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions 
and so on. The algorithm for cost allocation in HRC-Mfg 
should select a suitable solution according to specific 
manufacturing task and environment.
After assigning the related procedures to the human and 
the robot, it is necessary to schedule them in sequence. The 
HRC-Mfg with one-human-one-robot form has the 
characteristics of mixed execution. That is the manual 
procedures and the robot procedures are executed serially, but 
both of them constitute the relationship of parallel execution. 
Due to the dynamic nature of HRC-Mfg, after every
procedure is executed, the subsequent procedure sequence 
needs to be rearranged immediately. The clan game for 
procedure set is to solve the problem of how to schedule so 
that humans and robots can spend less on subsequent 
procedures.
The Weber set in cooperative games is a mathematical 
model related to the order of participants in a cooperative 
game. We consider HN and RN be the number of the 
manual procedures and robotic procedures to be scheduled, 
( )H PN N H and ( )R PN N R . Both of them are a 
Weber set and constitute an clan cooperative game
Nv G . 
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Take the robotic procedures as an instance, RN procedures 
constitute RN！permutations together, and the set of all RN！
permutations is donated as ( )RN , each permutation is 
defined as ( )RN  with the procedure sequence 
( (1), (2), , ( ))n   . 
For each procedure ( )i , we denote the cost function as 
( ( )) (0, )d i   , the dynamic factor as (0,1)i  , the 
priority constant as ip , the common difference of priority as 
 , respectively, the direct cost of the procedure, the cost 
impact by the HRC status, this procedure in the task's priority 
and the tolerance of the priority constant sequence. Finally,
we construct function (4) as the cost function for this 
procedure in the clan.
( ( )) ( ( ))i ic i p d i     (4)
For each determined permutation, a vector that depends on 
the permutation is constructed so that RN procedures could 
enter the permutation step by step. We consider the cost of 
(1) is ( (1))c  .After (2) enters the game, the cost of 
their clan becomes ( (1), (2))c   . And so on, the marginal 
cost of each procedure in this clan can be expressed as
function (5).
( ) ( ) ( ) ( (1), (2), , ( 1))RN R Rm c c N c N

      (5)
All marginal costs of each procedure in the function above 
constitute the marginal vector (6) of this clan cooperative 
game.
 (1) (2) ( )( ) ( ), ( ), ( )RNm c m c m c m c
   
   (6)
It is related to permutation  clearly, and RN！
permutations have RN！different marginal vectors. The 
convex hull of all ( )m c constitutes the Weber set of the 
game, we donate it as ( )W c . In this way, the optimal 
arrangement of robot procedures can be equivalent to finding 
one  in ( )RN to minimize the corresponding ( )m c
 , 
that is, solving the equation (7).
, ( )
( ( ), ( )) arg min ( )
NR
R
R
c G N
N W c m c
 

 
  (7)
4. Case study
Taking the disassembly task of ‘bolt type roller bearing’ as 
an example, a case study of HRC-Mfg based on the
cooperative game is presented. A roller bearing shown in the 
Fig. 3 contains 6 parts. For each bearing disassembly task, in 
addition to the starting step S and the end step E, there are 6 
subprocedures, ( ) 6PN U  . As shown in the Fig. 3, 1n is a 
procedure that can only be done manually, 3n is a procedure 
that can only be done by robots, and the rest can be done by 
both of them. Therefore, the procedure vector can be obtained 
as  1 1 0 1 1 1H  ,  0 1 1 1 1 1R 
and  1 1 1 1 1 1U H R  . It’s clearly 
satisfied with H R S and all elements of U are 1. So 
the current HRC-Mfg task is complete.
Given the ( ) 6PN U  , the bilateral game has 
62 64
equilibria, but because the allocation scheme of 1n and 3n is 
fixed, there are actually 42 16 alternative equilibria. In 
order to facilitate the calculation, we assume ({ }) 50c h  ,
({ }) 40c r  and the extreme point is
( , ) (0.02,0.025)h re e  . Calculating the 16 allocation 
schemes iteratively with function (8),
1
1 1
,
( , ) argmax( 0.02)( 0.025)h r
x F x e
F e x x

 
 
    (8)
the lowest cost allocation scheme is obtained, which 
corresponds to a ( , )P PH R , and it needs to be tested again. 
Suppose the allocation scheme obtained by bilateral 
cooperation game is  1 0 0 1 0 1PH  and
 0 1 1 0 1 0PR  with completed procedures.
In the clan game of procedure permutation, there 
is 3H RN N  . We take 3RN  as an example to 
calculate, and there are 6 permutations. It can be found in the 
Fig. 3 that ‘bolt type roller bearing’ disassembly have 3 
priorities, respectively 1 2 3 4 5 6{ },{ , },{ , , }n n n n n n . For
robotic procedures, all permutations are listed in function (9).
2 3 5 2 5 3 3 2 5
3 5 2 5 2 3 5 3 2
( ) {( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ),
( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , )}
RN n n n n n n n n n
n n n n n n n n n
 
(9)
We assume that the weights of the three priorities are 1, 6 and 
11 ( 5  ) respectively. The 2n , 3n , and 5n procedures
are represented as (2) , (3) and 
(5) .  ( ( )) 4 3 4d i  and  0.8 0.5 0.6i 
are assumed to be calculated. We might as well define one of 
the simplest marginal vector operations as function (10).
( ) ( ) ( (1), (2), , ( ))
( (1), (2), , ( 1)) ( ( )) ( ( 1))
km c c k
c k c k c k

   
    

    
(10)
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3.2. Cooperative game for human-robot collaborative  model 
with multiple procedures
In HRC-Mfg, the deployment contains various forms 
including ‘one-human-one-robot’, ‘one-human-multi-robots’, 
‘multi-humans-one-robot’ and ‘multi-humans-multi-robots’,. 
This paper takes ‘one-human-one-robot’ as an example to 
describe the combination of cooperative game.
In the principles introduced earlier, it is obviously difficult 
to find an optimal solution on a large scale such as an 
exponential model, which is called the multiple equilibrium 
problems in the traditional non-cooperative game. One of the 
most important ways to solve this problem is Schelling's 
theory of focalization. By setting up the focus arbiter, it 
guides the game players to focus their attention on a particular 
equilibrium, which is the optimal direct solution in HRC-Mfg. 
There is a kind of special focus arbiter in the theory of 
focalization, which is itself the player of the game. In HRC-
Mfg, the HRCMS that the industrial robot connects is 
responsible for the game solution, and then the robot can be 
regarded as a special focus arbiter.
As the Fig. 2 shows, the procedure decomposition problem 
in one-human-one-robot collaborative manufacturing is a 
typical substantive bilateral cooperative game. And the 
procedures allocation is a typical clan cooperative game. To 
explore the mechanism of that, it is necessary to establish two 
models of the bilateral game and the clan game.
In this paper, the bilateral game refers to the cooperative 
game with only two participants. The total utility of 
cooperative game is considered as ({ , })v r h , and the utility 
of robot is given as 1x . According to the premise of the 
cooperative game, it should not be less than the benefit 
({ })v r when robot completes a manufacturing task 
independently. It’s same to the utility of human workers and 
we define it as 2x . 
Fig. 2. Cooperative game for HRC-Mfg with multiple procedures.
Clearly, it can be written as 1 2 ({ , })x x v r h  and this 
equation can also be rewritten as 1 2 ( , )P Px x v R H  to 
correspond to the procedures vector in the previous section. 
These 1 2( , )x x constitute a utility allocation. All 1 2( , )x x
form the feasible collocation set F of the cooperative game. 
According to the characteristics of human-robot collaboration, 
one 1 2( , )x x has two obvious poles, namely ( ({ , }),0)v r h
and (0, ({ , }))v r h .
For the procedures allocation derivation of HRC-Mfg, first 
of all, the procedure cost is required to be associated with the 
utility. We denote the common cost of human and robot in 
HRC-Mfg as ({ , })c h r and the cost of human and robot are 
separately hx and rx respectively, then all the configurable 
sets are formed as F , with extremes ( ,0)hx and (0, )rx . 
For a one-human-one-robot cooperative game procedure
allocation problem ( , )F e , it can be modeled as (1) with the 
inability to reach an agreement 1 1( , ) ( , )h r h re e x x
  .
1 1 1 1{( , ) | & }- - - -h r h h r rF x x x e x e  (1)
It is a cooperative game of substantial essential. According to 
Nash axiom, the Nash solution of the game is (2).
1 1
1 1
,
( , ) argmax( )( )h h r r
x F x e
F e x e x e
 
 
 
    (2)
The cost function of the allocation scheme can be set 
according to the specific manufacturing tasks, such as by 
different indicators (like time cost ( )ti x , energy cost ( )ec x
and so on) in the weighted sum form (3).
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nc x ti x ec x other x         (3)
In addition to Nash solution, there are also egalitarian 
solutions, utilitarian solutions, Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions 
and so on. The algorithm for cost allocation in HRC-Mfg 
should select a suitable solution according to specific 
manufacturing task and environment.
After assigning the related procedures to the human and 
the robot, it is necessary to schedule them in sequence. The 
HRC-Mfg with one-human-one-robot form has the 
characteristics of mixed execution. That is the manual 
procedures and the robot procedures are executed serially, but 
both of them constitute the relationship of parallel execution. 
Due to the dynamic nature of HRC-Mfg, after every
procedure is executed, the subsequent procedure sequence 
needs to be rearranged immediately. The clan game for 
procedure set is to solve the problem of how to schedule so 
that humans and robots can spend less on subsequent 
procedures.
The Weber set in cooperative games is a mathematical 
model related to the order of participants in a cooperative 
game. We consider HN and RN be the number of the 
manual procedures and robotic procedures to be scheduled, 
( )H PN N H and ( )R PN N R . Both of them are a 
Weber set and constitute an clan cooperative game
Nv G . 
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Take the robotic procedures as an instance, RN procedures 
constitute RN！permutations together, and the set of all RN！
permutations is donated as ( )RN , each permutation is 
defined as ( )RN  with the procedure sequence 
( (1), (2), , ( ))n   . 
For each procedure ( )i , we denote the cost function as 
( ( )) (0, )d i   , the dynamic factor as (0,1)i  , the 
priority constant as ip , the common difference of priority as 
 , respectively, the direct cost of the procedure, the cost 
impact by the HRC status, this procedure in the task's priority 
and the tolerance of the priority constant sequence. Finally,
we construct function (4) as the cost function for this 
procedure in the clan.
( ( )) ( ( ))i ic i p d i     (4)
For each determined permutation, a vector that depends on 
the permutation is constructed so that RN procedures could 
enter the permutation step by step. We consider the cost of 
(1) is ( (1))c  .After (2) enters the game, the cost of 
their clan becomes ( (1), (2))c   . And so on, the marginal 
cost of each procedure in this clan can be expressed as
function (5).
( ) ( ) ( ) ( (1), (2), , ( 1))RN R Rm c c N c N

      (5)
All marginal costs of each procedure in the function above 
constitute the marginal vector (6) of this clan cooperative 
game.
 (1) (2) ( )( ) ( ), ( ), ( )RNm c m c m c m c
   
   (6)
It is related to permutation  clearly, and RN！
permutations have RN！different marginal vectors. The 
convex hull of all ( )m c constitutes the Weber set of the 
game, we donate it as ( )W c . In this way, the optimal 
arrangement of robot procedures can be equivalent to finding 
one  in ( )RN to minimize the corresponding ( )m c
 , 
that is, solving the equation (7).
, ( )
( ( ), ( )) arg min ( )
NR
R
R
c G N
N W c m c
 

 
  (7)
4. Case study
Taking the disassembly task of ‘bolt type roller bearing’ as 
an example, a case study of HRC-Mfg based on the
cooperative game is presented. A roller bearing shown in the 
Fig. 3 contains 6 parts. For each bearing disassembly task, in 
addition to the starting step S and the end step E, there are 6 
subprocedures, ( ) 6PN U  . As shown in the Fig. 3, 1n is a 
procedure that can only be done manually, 3n is a procedure 
that can only be done by robots, and the rest can be done by 
both of them. Therefore, the procedure vector can be obtained 
as  1 1 0 1 1 1H  ,  0 1 1 1 1 1R 
and  1 1 1 1 1 1U H R  . It’s clearly 
satisfied with H R S and all elements of U are 1. So 
the current HRC-Mfg task is complete.
Given the ( ) 6PN U  , the bilateral game has 
62 64
equilibria, but because the allocation scheme of 1n and 3n is 
fixed, there are actually 42 16 alternative equilibria. In 
order to facilitate the calculation, we assume ({ }) 50c h  ,
({ }) 40c r  and the extreme point is
( , ) (0.02,0.025)h re e  . Calculating the 16 allocation 
schemes iteratively with function (8),
1
1 1
,
( , ) argmax( 0.02)( 0.025)h r
x F x e
F e x x

 
 
    (8)
the lowest cost allocation scheme is obtained, which 
corresponds to a ( , )P PH R , and it needs to be tested again. 
Suppose the allocation scheme obtained by bilateral 
cooperation game is  1 0 0 1 0 1PH  and
 0 1 1 0 1 0PR  with completed procedures.
In the clan game of procedure permutation, there 
is 3H RN N  . We take 3RN  as an example to 
calculate, and there are 6 permutations. It can be found in the 
Fig. 3 that ‘bolt type roller bearing’ disassembly have 3 
priorities, respectively 1 2 3 4 5 6{ },{ , },{ , , }n n n n n n . For
robotic procedures, all permutations are listed in function (9).
2 3 5 2 5 3 3 2 5
3 5 2 5 2 3 5 3 2
( ) {( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ),
( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , )}
RN n n n n n n n n n
n n n n n n n n n
 
(9)
We assume that the weights of the three priorities are 1, 6 and 
11 ( 5  ) respectively. The 2n , 3n , and 5n procedures
are represented as (2) , (3) and 
(5) .  ( ( )) 4 3 4d i  and  0.8 0.5 0.6i 
are assumed to be calculated. We might as well define one of 
the simplest marginal vector operations as function (10).
( ) ( ) ( (1), (2), , ( ))
( (1), (2), , ( 1)) ( ( )) ( ( 1))
km c c k
c k c k c k

   
    

    
(10)
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Fig. 3. Bolt type roller bearing disassembly task.
Finally, we can get the result in Fig. 4 from the calculation. 
Obviously, 3 2 5( ) ( , , )RN n n n  is the optimal solution 
under the current conditions. 
Fig. 4. Case study result.
By observing the results of this clan game, it can be found 
that the optimal solution not only meets the requirements of 
procedures’ priority but also can correspond to the real-time 
HRC-Mfg status based on the cost function of the procedures.
5. Conclusion and future work
This paper proposed problems with the explanation of the 
mechanism of HRC-Mfg and summed up characteristics of it. 
We for the first time used the cooperative game theory in 
HRC-Mfg, put forward the framework of procedure allocation 
and permutation and explained why the cooperative game is 
suitable for HRC-Mfg with the case study demonstrated its 
practicality.
In future work, we will conduct mathematical modeling of 
‘multi-humans-multi-robots’ production line based on 
algorithm design and implementation. In addition, we will 
consider more realistic manufacturing situations, such as the 
iterative game mechanism when a manufacturing task is 
repeated, and interpret it with the theory of knowledge 
evolution.
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